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NOTE
FILTERING OUT PROTECTION:
THE LAW, THE LIBRARY, AND OUR
LEGACIES
As far as February mornings go in Rocky River, Ohio,' this is
an unusually bearable one. The sky is clear as the sunshine glis-
tens off the remnants of the preceding night's snowfall. The
thirty-degree temperature is relatively mild for this time of year so
a trip to Starbucks and the local public library 2 is in order. I round
up my two young sons, strap them into their double-stroller, and
embark on a journey in pursuit of exercise, caffeine, and enlight-
enment. We travel the four blocks to Starbucks and satisfy our
needs: for me, that means ordering a "Triple Venti Raspberry
White Mocha," 3 and for the kids, it means gathering straws, empty
cups, and stickers. Consuming coffee prior to visiting the library
is important for me, because, between the children's books, toys,
computer programs, and Internet access, we generally spend hours
within its confines.
Upon arriving at the library, I unfasten the safety straps on the
double-stroller and carry the boys into the building. As we make
our way to the second floor, I notice that an elderly gentleman is
occupying one of the first floor computer terminals equipped with
Internet access. The silver-haired computer user is wearing a
heavily starched button-down Oxford shirt, khaki trousers, and a
plaid vest. He seems out of place. Generally, this particular com-
I See Rocky River Website, at http://www.rrcity.com/comm.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2003). Rocky River is a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio in Cuyahoga County on the shores of Lake
Erie. Its population is 20,253.
2 See Rocky River Public Library Website, at http://www.rrpl.org/rrpl-info.stm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2003). The Rocky River Public library is one of over 9000 public libraries in
the United States. According to its Mission Statement, the Rocky River Public Library is com-
mitted to: "[p]reserving its unique atmosphere and personal service, adapting quickly and effi-
ciently to anticipate and meet community needs, and promoting freedom of information to all."
Id.
3 The beverage is a large specialty coffee drink that includes white mocha flavoring,
raspberry syrup, and three shots of espresso. See generally Reg Henry, Best to Mumble When
Ordering in Coffeespeak, PrITSBURGH POST-GAZETtE, Oct. 12, 1999, at D I ("My understand-
ing is that venti means 'bucket of caffeine' in Italian.").
767
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
puter cluster is filled with students from the Rocky River Middle
School,4 which is approximately fifty yards away. He must be
waiting for one of his grandchildren. As I bend down to tie one of
my son's shoes, I glance at the grandfatherly gentleman's com-
puter screen. Written across the top of the screen is "GAY PORN
PALACE." 5 After getting over the initial shock, I whisk my chil-
dren up to the second floor to decide how to proceed with this
knowledge.
Li Should I confront the man and instruct him against view-
ing pornography in a children's area of the library?
L Should I notify a librarian that an individual is using a
computer to view obscene material?
zi Should I consider the fact that confronting the elderly
gentleman or informing a librarian might lead to an em-
barrassing situation, potentially forcing the man into pub-
lic shame?
u How do I balance the man's potential public shame and
embarrassment with my responsibility as a parent to keep
my children free from being exposed to obscene mate-
rial?
The questions quickly turn from practical to legal.
L3 Should public library computers be equipped with Internet
filtering software?
6
Li Is it relevant that this public library is frequented by mid-
dle school children?
c3 Since public libraries receive federal funds, is there a ju-
dicially recognized non-textual constitutional right to
view pornography? To be free from viewing pornogra-
phy?
3 If Congress expends funds for public libraries to com-
mence and maintain Internet access for their patrons, is
Congress then free to condition those funds on the utiliza-
tion of Internet filtering software?
7
4 See Rocky River Middle School Website, at http://www.lnoca.org/-rrms/ (last visited
Mar. 25, 2003). The Rocky River Middle School is a publicly funded institution consisting of
600 students enrolled in sixth to eighth grade. Id.
See GAY PORN PALACE, at http://www.tufsl.con/gay-pornpalace (last visited Jan. 19,
2003).
6 See Jeannette Allis Bastian, Filtering the Internet in American Public Libraries: Sliding
Down the Slippery Slope, 2 FIRST MONDAY 10 (Oct. 6, 1997), at http://www.firstmon-
day.dk/issues/issue2_ I 0/bastian (last visited Feb. 1I, 2003).
7 Id.
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I decide to wait until we are about to leave and bring up the
issue with a librarian. At that time, she informs me that it is "un-
constitutional" for a public library to utilize Internet filtering soft-
ware and that many libraries, such as the Rocky River Public Li-
brary, generally follow an "acceptable use policy"' 8 when librarians
encounter a patron viewing pornography. I nod my head, express
my dissatisfaction as a parent and a taxpayer, buckle my children
into their double-stroller, and question the morals of the society in
which we live.
I. BACKGROUND
The battle lines over Internet filtering software in public li-
braries were drawn in 1998. In that year, a public librarian in only
one United States federal district would have been correct in stat-
ing that utilizing Internet filtering software is unconstitutional, but
due to the scarcity of litigation in this area, librarians in other fed-
eral districts likely formed that same belief. In Mainstream Lou-
doun v. Board of Trustees,9 adult patrons challenged the library's
use of filtering software on Internet access. Relying on the Su-
preme Court's divided opinion in Board of Education v. Pico, °
which held that a school board could not authorize the removal of
books from a school library because it disliked their content,' 1 a
federal judge in the Eastern District of Virginia held that the
blocking of Internet websites via filtering software ran afoul of the
First Amendment. 12 Thus, in public libraries situated within the
8 Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18-19, Am. Library Ass'n
v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d. 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (No. 01-1303), available at
http://www.ala.org/cipa/cipacomplaint.pdf [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Complaint]; see LIBRARY
RESEARCH CENTER, UNIV. OF ILL., SURVEY OF INTERNET ACCESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC
LIBRARIES 3-4 (2000).
The Library Research Center of the University of Illinois conducted this
study with funding from the American Library Association. A mail sur-
vey questionnaire was forwarded to a statistically random sample of
1,297 public libraries, selected from the 1997 Federal-State Cooperative
System annual directory file published by the National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics. Prior to sampling, tabulation of the FSCS directory file
yielded 7,049 libraries, or 79%, who reported having Internet access.
These libraries formed the survey universe for the study. There were
1,015 completed questionnaires, for response rate of 78.3%.
Id. at 1.
9 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998) [Mainstream Loudoun 11].
10 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
I d. at 866-67.
'2 U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
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bounds of the Eastern District of Virginia, the use of Internet fil-
tering software was thought to be unconstitutional. 13
Undeterred by a federal judge's ruling, Congress entered the
fray later that year. In 1998, Senator John McCain 14 devised and
introduced the Internet School Filtering Act,15 which, in its origi-
nal form, would have denied federal remuneration to any library
that did not utilize Internet filtering software to block "inappropri-
ate" material for minors. 16 During the next two years, similar pro-
posals were introduced in Congress, but not until December 2000
did a new version of Senator McCain's original bill pass both
houses of Congress. On December 21, 2000, President Clinton
signed the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA or the Act)' 7
into law as part of a major federal budget bill.' 8  The law became
effective on April 20, 2001.'9
CIPA conditions private and federal monies to public libraries
"on the mandatory installation and use of content blocking soft-
ware on all library Internet terminals, for both adults and mi-
nors."20  It prohibits a public library from receiving two classes of
funds2' for Internet service from the Federal Communications
13 Mainstream Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
14 See SEN. JOHN McCAIN's BIOGRAPHY, at http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm? fuseac-
tion=Bio.Home (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). "[McCain] served two terms in the House [of Repre-
sentatives] before being elected to the Senate in 1986 .... Senator McCain is Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, and has in that capacity become a
recognized leader on telecommunications [and aviation] issues." Id.
15 See S. 1619, 105th Cong. (1998).
16 Id; see Junichi P. Semitsu, Burning Cyberbooks In Public Libraries: Internet Filtering
Software vs. the First Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REV. 509, 524 (2000); Jeri Clausing, Committee
Adds Internet Filtering Amendment to Budget Bill, N.Y.TMES (CYBERTIMES), June 26, 1998, at
http://www.nytimes.comllibrary/tech/98/06/cyber/articles/26filter.html (last updated June 26,
1998).
7 Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(4), 114 Stat.
2763 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134 and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)-(C) (2003)) [hereinaf-
ter CIPA].
18 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
'9 See CIPA, §§ 1712, 1721.
20 Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 18-19; see CIPA §§ 1712, 1721.
21 CIPA, §§ 1712, 1721. The two funding sources are the universal service (or "E-rate")
discounts and Library Services and Technology Act grants. First, as part of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, "Congress directed the Federal Communications Commission to take the
steps necessary to establish a system of support mechanisms to ensure the delivery of affordable
telecommunications service to all Americans." Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F.
Supp. 2d 401, 411 (E.D. Pa. 2002). This "universal service," or "E-rate" Program, is codified in
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the 1996 Act. Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 254 (Supp.
1995-97). "[The] program provides libraries with discounted rates for access to telecommunica-
tions services, including local and long distance telephone service, high speed Internet access,
and internal network connections." Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 20; see 47 U.S.C. §
254. The Federal Communications Commission oversees the $2.25 billion annual program and
determines the appropriate discount on telecommunications services for each eligible public
library. id. The discounts "are set as a percentage of the pre-discount price, and range from
20% to 90%, depending on a library's level of economic disadvantage and its location in an
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Commission or the Institute of Museum and Library Services
unless the library installs Internet filtering software on all com-
puters to block Internet access to certain content. 2 Specifically, a
library must certify that it is:
enforcing a policy of Internet safety that includes the opera-
tion of a technology protection measure with respect to any
of its computers with Internet access that protects against ac-
cess through such computers to visual depictions that are (I)
obscene; (II) child pornography; or (I) harmful to minors;
and is enforcing the operation of such technology protection
measure during any use of such computers by minors.
23
A "technology protection measure" is defined as "a specific
technology that blocks or filters internet access to visual depictions
that are obscene, . . .child pornography, . . .. or harmful to mi-
nors." 24  CIPA defines "minor" as an individual under seventeen
years of age.25 Importantly, it provides that "[a]n administrator,
supervisor, or other person authorized by the certifying authority.
may disable the technology protection measure concerned, dur-
ing use by an adult [or minor], to enable access for bona fide re-
search or other lawful purpose. 26 The price of noncompliance is
high. Since 1996, over $190 million has been disbursed to more
than 5000 public libraries through the "E-rate" (universal service)
Program.27 Meanwhile, the Institute of Museum and Library Ser-
urban or rural area." Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 412; see 47 C.F.R. § 54.505 (2001).
Interestingly, telecommunications carriers are legally required to fund the program by "con-
tribut[ing] a portion of their revenue for disbursement among eligible carriers that are providing
services to those groups or areas specified by Congress in section 254." Am. Library Ass'n, 201
F. Supp. 2d at 412. But see 47 C.F.R. § 54.706 (2001) (listing entities that are exempted from
the contribution requirement). The second source of funding is the Institute of Museum and
Library Services, an agency created by the Library Services and Technology Act of 1996. See
Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA), 20 U.S.C. § 9121 (current version 2000) (stating
the purpose of the Library Services and Technology Act). The agency, through the Grants to
States Program, distributes funds "in order to assist libraries in accessing information through
electronic networks and pay for the costs of acquiring or sharing computer systems and tele-
communications technologies." Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 412; see 20 U.S.C. §
9141(a) (listing ways in which state agencies can spend grant money).
22 CIPA §§ 1712, 1721.
23 Id. § 1721(b) (quoted in Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 413).
7 Id. § 1703(b)(1) (quoted in Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 413).
2 Id. § 1721(c).
26 Id. § 1721(b) (quoted in Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 413). It is worth noting
that in order to receive "universal service," or "E-rate" discounts, a library administrator may
only disable the technology protection measure for an adult's bona fide research purpose. How-
ever, a library administrator may also disable the technology protection measure for a minor and
continue to receive LSTA funds. Am. Library Ass 'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 414.
27 JOHN CARLO BERTOT & CHARLES R. MCCLURE, PUBLIC LIBRARIES AND THE INTER-
NET 2000: SUMMARY FINDINGS AND DATA TABLES 4, 15 (Sept. 7, 2000), available at
2003]
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vices distributed $200 million in funds in 2001, provided under the
Library Services and Technology Act of 1996.28
On March 20, 2001, one month before CIPA was to take ef-
fect, the American Library Association 29 (ALA) filed a lawsuit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania in an attempt to invalidate the Act.3° On July 26, 2001, a
three-judge federal district court panel denied the government's
motion to dismiss the case. 31 The trial was held from March 25,
2002, through April 3, 2002.
This Note seeks to answer the question of whether Congress
overstepped its legislative bounds in enacting CIPA by exploring
the First Amendment issues raised by Internet filtering software in
public libraries. Understanding the pervasiveness of Internet com-
puter terminals in public libraries and the technology that is avail-
able to filter obscene materials and material harmful to minors is
of critical importance in this analysis.
II. EXTRA, EXTRA! GET YOUR INTERNET ACCESS HERE: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC LIBRARY
The government's purpose in establishing and maintaining
public libraries is to facilitate an individual's ability to obtain ac-
cess to speech, not to act as a speaker seeking to communicate
with a library patron.32 This ALA intellectual freedom principle
was bolstered by a fractured court in Pico, in which the plurality
"expressed concern that elected officials, not professional educa-
http://www.nclis.gov/statsurv/200OplO.pdf (report to National Commission on Libraries and
Information Science); see Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 21-22.
28 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 23.
29 See generally ALA MISSION, MEMBERSHIP, ORGANIZATION - AN OVERVIEW, at
http://www.ala.org/alaorg/mission.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). "The American Library
Association, founded in 1876, is the oldest and largest national library association in the world."
Id. The ALA's mission is "to provide leadership for the development, promotion, and im-
provement of library and information services and the profession of librarianship in order to
enhance learning and ensure access to information for all." Id. "As of November 30, 2001, the
ALA had 5,138 organization members, 261 corporate members, and 58,292 personal members -
a total of 63,691." Id.
- Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 1.
3' Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, No. 01-1303, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15920, at *3
(E.D. Pa. July 26, 2001). "After careful consideration of the pending motions and responses, we
have concluded that plaintiffs' complaints in these actions contain enough factual allegations to
withstand dismissal. Plaintiffs are entitled to an opportunity to prove their allegations." Id. at
*5 (Opinion of Becker, Ch. J., Fullam, Sr. J., Bartle, J.). The ultimate outcome and reasoning of
the case are discussed in Part VIII of this Note.
32 See Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering, and The First Amendment: Ruminations On Pub-
lic Libraries' Use Of Internet Filtering Software, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 191,220 (2001); see Am.
Library Ass'n, AM. LIBRARY ASS'N POLICY MANUAL 53.1, available at http://www.ala.org/
alaorg/policymanual/intellect.htm (last modified Feb. 6, 2003).
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tors," were effectively censoring reading material. 33 In Pico, pub-
lic school board members in a Long Island, New York school dis-
trict demanded and obtained the removal of eleven "objectionable"
books from school libraries, including The Naked Ape by Desmond
Morris, Black Boy by Richard Wright, Down These Mean Streets
by Piri Thomas, Soul On Ice by Eldridge Cleaver, Slaughterhouse
Five by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., and Laughing Boy by Oliver La-
Farge.34 Although Pico dealt with the issue of public schools, the
case is widely recognized as highly relevant to the constitutionality
of public libraries' use of Internet filtering software. 35 Although
Pico contained six separate opinions and failed to generate a ma-
jority opinion, it is important to juxtapose the actions of removing
library books and installing filtering software on computers.
In 1948, the ALA ratified the first Library Bill of Rights,36
which illustrated the unique role that public libraries play in our
society. The Library Bill of Rights characterizes the public library
as an invaluable forum and mandates that "[b]ooks and other liter-
ary resources should be provided for the interest, information, and
enlightenment of all people of the community the library serves. 3 7
The Library Bill of Rights further states: "[m]aterials should not
be excluded because of the origin, background, or views of those
contributing to their creation. 38 It also says that "libraries should
provide materials and information presenting all points of view on
current and historical issues. Materials should not be proscribed or
removed because of partisan or doctrinal disapproval. 39
Historically, courts have echoed the Library Bill of Rights by
stressing that public libraries are traditional arenas of free expres-
sion dedicated to the communication and receipt of information.40
The evolution of the public library has also brought new, dynamic
roles and job functions for the typical librarian. In addition to
making sure the library is current with orders for best-selling
33 Bell, supra note 32, at 215; see Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 856 (1982).
-4 Pico, 457 U.S. at 857 n.3.
35 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech?: CDA 2.0 v. Filtering, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 629, 657 (1998).
36 ALA Library Bill of Rights, art. I, available at http://www.ala.org/work/free-
dom/lbr.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
37 Id. (quoted in Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 420 (E.D. Pa.
2002)).
38 Id.
39 Id. art. II (quoted in Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420).
40 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 18. Public libraries are "designed for free-
wheeling inquiry." Pica, 457 U.S. at 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). A public library is "the
quintessential locus of the receipt of information." Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242,
1255 (3d Cir. 1992). A library is a "mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas." Minar-
cini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976).
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books and subscriptions to periodicals, librarians must make sure
their library's Ethernet cards 41 are set to download 100 kilobytes
per second. This is because library patrons may be more inclined
to do their "freewheeling inquiry ' 42 sitting in front of a computer
monitor than by traditional means of walking the library aisles in
order to locate hard-copy materials.
The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of the Internet
as an expansive medium for worldwide communication, analo-
gized it to a public library, and ruled that an individual's right to
receive information via the Internet is constitutionally protected.43
The Internet, or World Wide Web, may be divided into the "pub-
licly indexable Web" and the "Deep Web." 44 The publicly index-
able Web includes only web pages that may be accessed through
the "spidering technology" of search engines. 45 Presently, the pub-
licly indexable Web comprises over two billion web pages and is
growing by an estimated 1.5 million pages per day. The Deep
Web consists of Web pages inaccessible by search engines, and as
such, it is virtually impossible to decipher the exact volume of
pages and rate of growth.47 However, recent estimates suggest that
the Deep Web's size is "two to ten times that of the publicly in-
dexable Web. 4 8 According to a recent report by the U.S. National
Commission on Libraries and Information Science, 49 approxi-
mately 96% of all public libraries provide access to the Internet. 50
This was a dramatic increase from a 1998 study, which found that
only 73% of the public libraries provided access to the Internet. 51
This recent report revealed that significant increases in public li-
brary Internet usage occurred in all types of libraries regardless of
the area's poverty or metropolitan status. 52 In addition to the per-
centage increases for Internet access, this recent report also re-
vealed that since 1998, libraries nearly doubled their number of
41 An Ethernet card is "[a] network adapter that enables a computer to connect to an
Ethernet. It is a printed circuit board that is plugged into the computers on the Ethernet or may
be built into their motherboards." HIGH-TECH DICTIONARY, at http://www.computeruser.coml
resources/dictionary/index.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). An Ethernet is "[t]he most popular
type of local area network, which sends its communications through radio frequency signals
carried by a coaxial cable." Id.
42 Pico, 457 U.S. at 915.
43 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
44 Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 402, 418-19 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 419.
47 Id. at 418-19.
48 Id. at 419.
49 B ERTOT & MCCLURE, supra note 27, at 1.
50 Id. at 10 (quoted in Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 422).
51 BERTOT & MCCLURE, supra note 27, at 3.
52 Id.
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public access workstations, 53 and the speed of connectivity for
public access Internet services sharply increased.54
It is valuable to recognize that even rural libraries and those
with poverty levels greater than 40% are able to provide TI
access. The data show an increase of 10.1% for rural librar-
ies, an increase of 7.6% for libraries with more than 40%
poverty, and an overall increase of connectivity at TI speeds
by 14.3%.15
As these statistics indicate, children in urban and rural areas
can now receive obscene and pornographic material in a record
number of public libraries, equipped with a record number of com-
puter terminals, via state-of-the-art network connections. In re-
sponse to that moral dilemma, the world of technology, aided by
politicians across the country, has developed a way to decelerate
one's Internet surfing session at record speeds: Internet filtering
software.
III. "IT IS EMPHATICALLY THE PROVINCE AND DUTY OF THE
FILTERING SOFTWARE TO SAY WHAT THE [PORN] IS.56
A. Network-Based Internet Filtering Software
CIPA's "technology protection measure" 57 statutory language
may be viewed as encompassing a wide-ranging spectrum of Inter-
net filtering software products. In designing their products, soft-
ware developers seek to achieve a common goal while utilizing a
variety of methods. Prior to CIPA's passage, most of the seven
percent of public libraries mandating the use of Internet filtering
software58 utilized network-based filtering products, such as Surf-
Control's Cyber Patrol, N2H2's Bess/i2100, Secure Computing's
SmartFilter, and Websense. 59 Once a computer user enters a do-
53 Id. at 3-4.
54 Id. at 4.
55 Id. "A TI line is a telephone line connection for digital transmission that can handle 24
voice or data channels at 64 kilobits per second, over two twisted pair wires. TI lines are used
for heavy telephone traffic, or for computer networks linked directly to the Internet. TI lines
are normally used by small and medium-sized companies [including public libraries], with
heavy network traffic. They can send and receive very large text files, graphics, sounds, and
databases very quickly." HIGH-TECH DICTIONARY, supra note 41.
56 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
57 CIPA, supra note 17, § 1703(b)(1) (quoted in Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201
F. Supp. 2d 401,413 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
58 LIBRARY RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 8, at 17 (quoted in Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F.
Supp. 2d at 426).
59 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
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main name 60 or an IP address 61 into an Internet browser, these net-
work-based filtering software products funnel the request and
check the entered address against their "control list. '62 Each filter-
ing software product generally contains "between 200,000 and
600,000 URLs ...and the [control] lists determine which URLs
will be blocked., 63  The software developers divide their control
lists into numerous categories, including entertainment, pornogra-
phy, travel, adult/sexually explicit, kids' sites, and mili-
tancy/extremist. 64 Interestingly, the filtering software companies
treat these categories as trade secrets and retain exclusive access as
to which URLs exist within each category. 65  The software cus-
tomers, such as public library administrators, decide which catego-
ries to "enable," or block,66 and the technology allows them to go
beyond "enabling" and add or remove specific URLs for their spe-
cific network.67
B. Host- & Keyword-Blocking Methods
The network-based Internet filtering software products utilize
a form of the host blocking method to control the receipt of Inter-
net content. 68  Generally, this method targets pre-selected, unac-
ceptable Internet sites for blocking. 69  Host-blocking filtering
software has been sharply criticized for inadvertently blocking in-
nocuous sites dealing with women's issues, homosexual issues,
and environmental issues.7 ° Specifically, this type of software has
blocked "university safe-sex information pages" and "the Journal
of the American Medical Association's HIV/AIDS information
page."' The director of the Internet Filter Assessment Project,72
60 A domain name is "[ain Internet address in alphabetic form." HIGH-TECH DICTION-
ARY, supra note 41.
61 Id. (defining an IP address, or Internet Protocol Address, as "a numeric address such as
123.231.32.2 that the domain name server translates into a domain name").
62 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 428.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 428-29. "SurfControl uses 40 such categories, N2H2 uses 35 categories (and
seven 'exception' categories), Websense uses 30 categories, and Secure Computing uses 30
categories." Id. at 428.
65 Id. at 429-30.
66 Id. at 428.
67 Id. at 429.
68 Bastian, supra note 6.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 15.
72 See THE INTERNET FILTER ASSESSMENT PROJECT, at http://www.bluehighways.
com/tifap/tifap.htm. ("The Internet Filter Assessment Project ran from April to September 1997
.... The purpose of this project was to take a hard look at Internet content filters from a librar-
ian's point of view. Several dozen librarians from around the world participated.").
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Karen Schneider, identified two major problems with host block-
ing:
first and most importantly, that the decisions on which sites
to block are being made by vendors and not librarians so that
'however skilled the selectors may be in their original profes-
sions, like opticians pinch-hitting for shoe clerks, their new
duties do not suit them well,' and second, that host blocking
is reactive rather than proactive and the site has to exist and
be identified before it can be blocked.73
Schneider poignantly articulates that selecting resources from
larger pools of information is what librarians do, and host-blocking
software usurps their power, authority, and experience in selecting
these resources in favor of the software programmer.
The advent of sophisticated, network-based Internet filtering
software illustrates the recent dynamic advances in filtering tech-
nology. Prior to the influx of control lists and categories, key-
word-based filtering software was the product of choice for the
majority of librarians. While a handful of Internet filtering soft-
ware companies currently combine host and keyword-based block-
ing methods into their products, pure keyword-based filtering
software is presently in a distinct minority. This method targets
words or strings of words to be blocked, and is utilized by the
popular Cybersitter and Net Nanny. 74 Critics complain that key-
word-based filtering software blocks harmless material due to its
inability to place keywords into context.75 Specifically, this type
of software has blocked items on "breast cancer," "Essex County,"
"Super Bowl XXX," and "Beaver College. 76
C. Platform for Internet Content Selection
A number of the network-based Internet filtering software
products have recently incorporated Platform for Internet Content
Selection ratings-based software (PICS) into their browsers.77
PICS is a technological infrastructure that associates metadata with
Internet content, and is "designed to help exchange information
7- Karen G. Schneider, TIFAP: The Internet Filter Assessment Project Preliminary Re-
port, Phase 2 (1997), at www.bluehighways.com/tifap/testl.htm (quoted in Bastian, supra note
6).
74 See Bastian, supra note 6 (discussing how various filtering services operate).
75 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 15.
76 Id; see Bastian, supra note 6.
77 See Semitsu, supra note 16, at 517 (describing PICS as an "emerging industry proto-
col").
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between software and ratings or resource discovery services. 78
PICS technology allows ratings, voluntarily labeled for their con-
tent by website owners, to be exchanged with Internet filtering
software. 79 These ratings, or labels attached to the content, indi-
cate to the filtering software whether or not the computer user is
allowed to view a website.8 ° PICS software allows for ratings
"from one to ten for example, under criterion ranging from 'reli-
gious content' to 'graphic sex content,"' allowing each individual
network administrator to decide what numerical level is appropri-
ate for viewing. 81 Third-party sources determine the applicable
ratings for content based upon "ratings vocabularies," thus remov-
ing the critical subjective decision concerning the appropriateness,
relevance, or description of the content from judicial review. 2 In
lieu of judicial review, the Internet Content Rating Association
(ICRA) oversees the ratings system and allows website owners to
label their sites on the ICRA homepage.
83
IV. SOUNDS GOOD, BUT DOES IT WORK?
A few years before the more restrictive and controversial pas-
sage of CIPA, Congress began to investigate the efficiency of
Internet filtering software. The significance of the Child Online
Protection Act, 84 in 1998, was not the rights and liabilities associ-
ated with the statute, but rather the Act's directive to create a tem-
porary commission of nineteen members to study protecting chil-
dren on the Internet. On October 20, 2000, the Commission on
Child Online Protection issued its report to Congress, illustrating
its recommendations on how best to implement technological tools
and methods for protecting minors from harmful Internet material.
The Commission found that "no single technology or method will
78 Terry Kuny, Nat'l Library of Canada, Filtering Internet Content: PICS, Labels and
Filters, Network Notes #53 (Mar. 23, 1998), at http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/publications/l/pl-252-
e.html.
79 Id.
80 Id. ("Labels are descriptions of the content.")
81 Semitsu, supra note 16, at 517-18.
82 Kuny, supra note 78.
83 See INTERNET CONTENT RATING ASSOCIATION, at http://www.icra.org (last visited Feb.
14,2003).
85 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000); see COPA COMMISSION WEBSITE, at http:// www.co-
pacommission.org/commission/faq.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2003) ("The Child Online Protec-
tion Act, known as COPA, was passed October 23, 1998 as part of an omnibus budget bill and
was signed into law by President Clinton. The purpose of [COPA] was to prohibit online sites
from knowingly making available to minors material that is 'harmful to minors' (sexually
explicit material meeting definitions set forth in [COPA]). Commercial providers of 'harmful to
minors' material may defend themselves against prosecution by restricting the access of minors
to such material.").
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effectively protect children from harmful material online, 85 and
concluded that "[t]he child-protective technologies and methods
evaluated by the Commission provide an important but incomplete
measure of protection" from online material that is harmful to mi-
nors.
86
Consumer Reports attempted to settle this hotly contested de-
bate in its March 2001 issue by conducting two separate tests on
six of the most widely used filtering software titles: "How well do
filters block bad stuff? ' 87 and "Do filters block good stuff? ' 88 The
first test revealed that only a few filters actually blocked desig-
nated inappropriate sites, the most successful being a PICS system
incorporated in the AOL browser. 89 The study showed that AOL's
Young Teen control was the most efficient by a wide margin, "al-
loWv[ing] only one site through in its entirety, along with portions
of about 20 other sites." 90 The other filters tested allowed twenty
percent or more of the sites through in their entirety. 91 The study
showed some inconsistencies in various forms of filtering soft-
ware; for instance, Net Nanny displays parts of websites, often
with obscene words omitted but graphic images in full view.92
In the second test, Consumer Reports found that the filters
blocked harmless, legitimate sites "merely because their software
[did] not consider the context in which a word or phrase is used. 93
The test results showed that most filters blocked only a few legiti-
mate sites, but there were exceptions. Most notably, Cybersitter
2000 and Internet Guard Dog blocked nearly one in five, [while]
AOL's Young Teen control blocked 63 percent of the [harmless]
sites." 94 AOL representatives reasoned that since its staff and sub-
scriber parents select the sites appropriate for children, with an
85 Comm'n on Child Online Protection, Report to Congress, at 9 (2000), available at
http://www.copacommission.org/report/COPAreport.pdf.
86 Id. at 10.
87 Filtering Software Test: Digital Chaperones for Kids, CONSUMER REPS., Mar. 2001, at
21 [hereinafter Digital Chaperones]. The magazine's main test determined how accurately the
filters performed in blocking objectionable content. Consumer Reports "configured . . . six
[filtering software] products for a 13- to 15-year-old, [and] also tested AOL's Young Teen (ages
13 to 15) and Mature Teen (ages 16 to 17) parental controls." Id. The magazine "pitted them
all against a list of 86 easily located web sites that contain sexually explicit content or violently
graphic images, or that promote drugs, tobacco, crime, or bigotry." Id.
88 Id. at 22. "To see whether the filters interfere with legitimate content, we [Consumer
Reports] pitted them against a list of 53 web sites that featured serious content on controversial
subjects." Id.
89 Id. at 21.
90 Id.91 /d. at 21-22.
92 Id. at 22.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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emphasis on education and entertainment, the Consumer Reports
legitimate test sites may have been blocked because they failed to
match AOL's pre-selected sites.95
On the basis of this less-than-ringing endorsement of filtering
software, Consumer Reports concluded that "[f]iltering software is
no substitute for parental supervision. ''96 In the current state of
filtering technology, even librarians can fall prey to the inexacti-
tude. In a study on the effects of filtering software in public librar-
ies, The Internet Filter Assessment Project (TIFAP) recently re-
ported that filtering software blocked librarians from seeking in-
formation needed to answer a question thirty-five percent of the
time.97 These types of results have opened some eyes throughout
the media and computer industries: "Perhaps the greatest crime
here is the use of names like 'sitter' and 'nanny; to market these
products, implying that they'll keep young, impressionable minds
safe on the Internet. 98
The Commission's recommendations, the Consumer Reports
testing, and the TIFAP study clearly indicate that the filtering
technology has improved in the last couple of years, but that the
current technology is far from perfect. Currently, there are over
144 different filtering software programs available for use on li-
brary computers, and the number is rapidly increasing. 99 Many
scholars believe the future of filtering technology revolves around
the PICS ratings-based system,100 but right now even PICS might
allow obscenity and pornography to flow freely right onto your
child's desktop.
V. HOUSES DIVIDED: FILTERING SOFTWARE IN PUBLIC LIBRARIES
BEFORE THE CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT
A. Pre-CIPA Trends in Filtering Software Use
Prior to the passage of CIPA, the vast majority of public li-
braries left it to library administrators to formulate policies that
allowed librarians to police computer terminals. One recent study
found that 95% of all libraries providing public Internet access
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See Schneider, supra note 73 (evaluating the performance of filters in a library setting).
98 Larry Greenemeier, Protecting Minors: Filters Fail to Keep Kids Safe, INFORMATION
WEEK, Mar. 19, 2001, at 102.
99 Kathleen Conn, Protecting Children From Internet Harm (Again): Will The Children's
Internet Protection Act Survive Judicial Scrutiny?, 153 EDUC. L. REP. 469, 476 (2001).
100 See Kuny, supra note 78 (explaining PICS and other technologies being used to filter
content on the Internet).
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have a written policy or set of guidelines to "regulate public use of
the Internet."'' ° In addition, among those libraries without a for-
mal policy, the study found that 50% are "in the process" of for-
mulating a policy and 26% are considering formulating one. 10 2 A
substantial number of these policies do not include Internet filter-
ing software. The study revealed that only 17% of libraries use
filters on at least some terminals for Internet access. 10 3 The study
further noted that a mere 7% of libraries utilized filtering software
on all computer terminals. °4 The study showed that 64% of librar-
ies require parental permission for children's use of the Internet,
perhaps in order to achieve the precise aim of filtering software. 0 5
This tactical, anti-filter approach taken by public libraries was ef-
fective, at least according to the librarians.
Do we censor? Of course we do. We have signs around the
computer with four broad categories we discourage the use of
because they're a nuisance. The first is computer games, Star
Wars, that kind of stuff. The second thing is we don't permit
computers to be used to observe pornography. 1
06
The Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County (Virginia) Pub-
lic Library did not share the pervasive opinion that "hanging
signs" was a significant deterrent to obscenity and child pornogra-
phy. No, a stronger measure needed to be in place to protect the
county's children, and the library administrators joined the ranks
of the 7% of libraries requiring filtering software on all computers.
B. The Loudoun County Litigation
In 1997, the Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Public
Library enacted a "Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment" which
required that "'[s]ite-blocking software . . . be installed on all [li-
brary] computers' so as to: 'a. block child pornography and ob-
scene material (hard core pornography)'; and 'b. block material
deemed Harmful to Juveniles under applicable Virginia statutes
and legal precedents (soft core pornography)." ' 107 The policy di-
rected the six Loudoun County library branches to install Internet
101 LIBRARY RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 8, at 3.
102 Id. at 4.
103 Id. at 7.
'(' See id. at 7-8.
105 Id. at 8.
106 Coco McCabe, Librarians Question Internet Access Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 15,
2000, at NW1 (quoting Hugh E. Williams Jr., Stoneham (Massachusetts) public library direc-
tor).
107 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 787 (E.D. Va. 1998) [Main-
stream Loudoun I].
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filtering software on every library computer. 0 8 Specifically, each
of the branch libraries installed keyword-based X-Stop filtering
software, which was criticized by filtering opponents as "clumsy
and ineffective, often blocking innocuous sites."' 9  A group of
Loudoun County residents challenged the policy, claiming that X-
Stop filtering software blocked access to protected speech, that the
policy lacked "clear criteria for blocking decisions," and that it
"unconstitutionally chill[ed] plaintiffs' receipt of constitutionally
protected materials."
'
" 
0
In November 1998, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia ruled that the Board of Trustees over-
stepped its constitutional bounds by requiring Internet filtering
software."' First, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema ruled that a public
library's installation of Internet filtering software is to be con-
strued as a removal decision, rather than as a proper discretionary
acquisition decision, thereby implicating the First Amendment."1
2
Second, Judge Brinkema found that by explicitly offering expres-
sive activity, in the form of the receipt and communication of in-
formation through the Internet, the six Loudoun County branch
libraries were limited public fora. 113 As a result, the policy's con-
tent-based restriction had to be "necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end.""1
14
Third, Judge Brinkema assumed the presence of compelling state
interests of "minimizing access to illegal pornography and avoid-
ance of creation of a sexually hostile environment,""' 5 but found
Loudoun County's filtering policy to be neither reasonably neces-
sary to further those interests' 6 nor narrowly tailored to achieve
those interests."t7 Judge Brinkema listed several less restrictive
measures: utilizing privacy screens, directing the library staff to
casually monitor Internet use, or installing filtering software on
terminals used by minors only."18
The Mainstream Loudoun decision gave life to legislation on
Capitol Hill and galvanized support for Senator McCain's efforts
108 Id.
109 Geraldine P. Rosales, Note, Mainstream Loudoun and the Future of Internet Filtering
for America's Public Libraries, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 357, 360-61 (2000).
110 Mainstream Loudoun I, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
I Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 570 (E.D. Va. 1998) [Main-
stream Loudoun II].
112 Id. at 561.
113 Id. at 563.
114 Id.
"5 Id. at 565 (footnote omitted).
116 Id. at 566.
17 Id. at 567.
118 Id.
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to condition federal funds on public libraries installing filtering
software on their computers. As one critic observed:
[M]ost adults cannot be with their children every moment of
the day and night and rarely sit beside them looking over
their shoulders at the public library. Judge Brinkema and the
good folks of Mainstream Loudoun couldn't care less about
these parents' rights to protect their children or the commu-
nity's interest in upholding standards of decency. If their
radical interpretation of the [First] Amendment prevails, it
will not only pollute the culture but debase the very liberties
they claim they want to protect.' 19
The groundswell of support and enthusiasm following Main-
stream Loudoun was tempered by the reality that the first time
Congress attempted to regulate children's access to the Internet,1
20
the Supreme Court struck down the legislation because its content-
based restrictions were unconstitutionally overbroad and not nar-
rowly tailored.12 1  Congress' next attempt at regulating in this
area was moderately more successful. Two years after Congress
was enjoined from enforcing the Child Online Protection Act by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 23 the Su-
preme Court vacated the ruling and remanded the case. 124 Finally
on December 15, 2000, following its long and unsuccessful quest
to protect children from obscene material and pornography on the
Internet, Congress passed the Fiscal Year 2001 Appropriations
Bill, 125 which included CIPA.
VI. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S FINAL DAYS: THE MARC RICH PARDON
AND THE CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT
President Clinton's signing of the CIPA into law turned out to
be a controversial move. As briefly explained earlier, CIPA re-
quires public libraries to install filtering software on all library
Internet computer terminals as a condition to receiving certain
119 Linda Chavez, Radical Interpretation of the 1st Amendment and Pornography in Li-
braries, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 1998, at 27.
120 Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)-(h) (2000). The CDA
prohibited the knowing transmission over the Internet of obscene or indecent messages to any
recipient under eighteen years of age. Id.
121 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
122 Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C
§ 231 (a)-(e)).
123 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166-67 (3d Cir. 2000).
124 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
125 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
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funds that provide assistance to libraries for Internet service. 126
The two funding sources at issue are the "universal service" or "E-
rate" discounts to libraries provided under the Communications
Act of 1934, and LSTA funds administered under the Library Ser-
vices and Technology Act of 1996.127 In order to receive these
funds, CIPA dictates that a public library must certify that it is
"enforcing a policy of Internet safety that includes the operation of
a technology protection measure with respect to any of its com-
puters with Internet access that protects against access through
such computers to visual depictions that are (I) obscene; (II) child
pornography; or (III) harmful to minors; and is enforcing the op-
eration of such technology protection measure during any use of
such computers by minors. 128 CIPA includes a disabling provi-
sion, as it provides that "[a]n administrator, supervisor, or other
person authorized by the certifying authority . . . may disable the
technology protection measure concerned, during use by an adult
[or minor], to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful
purpose."' 129 CIPA went into effect on April 20, 2001, and libraries
were to undertake action toward compliance by July 1, 2001 in
order to receive the funds. 30
The constitutional concerns raised in the statute's legislative
history mirror those raised by the Commission on Child Online
Protection report 13 1 and the Consumer Reports study. 132 Congres-
sional testimony from librarians, 133 technology experts,' 34 and law
professors 135 all pointed to general inaccuracies of filtering soft-
ware and the constitutional problems associated with filtering or
blocking constitutionally protected material. The Congressional
Research Service analyzed CIPA and found the statute to be con-
stitutionally questionable at best.
[I]t does not appear possible for software to block [constitu-
tionally protected] material without simultaneously blocking
constitutionally protected material. This is because it may be
126 See supra Part I.
127 See supra note 21.
128 CIPA, supra note 17, § 254(h)(6)(B).
129 Id. § 254 (h)(6)(D); see also supra note 26 (regarding disabling during use by minors).
130 Id. § 254 (h)(6)(E)(i).
131 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
133 See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 21 (1998) (testimony of Agnes M. Griffen, Director,
Tuscon-Pima Public Library); S. REP. No. 106-97, at 38 (1999) (testimony of Candace Morgan,
Associate Director, Fort Vancouver Regional Library).
04 See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 21 (1998) (testimony of Jerry Berman, Executive Direc-
tor, Center for Democracy and Technology).
'35 See id. (testimony of Prof. Larry Lessig, Harvard Law School Professor).
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impossible, in principle, to design technology that could dis-
tinguish obscenity from non-obscenity, child pornography
from non-child pornography, and harmful-to-minors material
from non-harmful-to-minors material.
36
The negative legislative history and the outcry from groups
such as the ALA 137 foreshadowed immediate legal challenges to
the constitutionality of the statute. The first lawsuit was filed a
month before the legislation even took effect. The future of chil-
dren's safety in public libraries is now squarely before the Su-
preme Court. It is time to "say what the law is."'
' 38
VII. SURVIVING JUDICIAL SCRUTINY: THE "RIGHT" TO ACCESS
PORNOGRAPHY
A. Conditional Spending
The first step a court should take in analyzing CIPA is a con-
ditional spending analysis. In essence, the conditional spending
framework set the following constitutional rules for Congress in
enacting CIPA. First, when Congress exercises its spending
power, it must do so within "the general welfare."' 139 Second, if it
is conditional spending, the condition must be clear. 40 Essen-
tially, the condition must be obvious to all parties involved; the
quid and the quo must be evident. Third, the condition(s) for the
receipt of federal funds must relate to the national interest. 141
Fourth, and most importantly with respect to this piece of legisla-
tion, the federal government cannot induce action with conditional
spending where independent prohibitions exist. 42  Generally, a
good example of this would be Congress making the statement that
"in exchange for this huge pot of federal money, you have to give
up your right to vote." The above garden-variety illustration of an
136 Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 24 (quoting Congressional Research Service
Memorandum, Sept. 1, 2000, at 15).
137 See ALA MISSION, MEMBERSHIP, ORGANIZATION - AN OVERVIEW, supra note 29.
The organization's website details its attack on the constitutionality of the legislation. Id.
138 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
119 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619, 640-41 (1937)).
140 See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Haldermann, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
141 See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978).
142 See, e.g., Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985)
(supporting this prong of the conditional spending analysis); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam) (also supporting this prong of the conditional spending analysis);
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n. 34 (1968) (also supporting this prong of the conditional
spending analysis).
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independent prohibition on conditional spending can be easily
analogized to Congress issuing federal funds or discounts through
CIPA on the condition that library patrons suspend their First
Amendment rights. Assuming that the right to communicate and
receive obscenity and pornography is constitutionally protected,
the fact that Congress has attached it to a spending program does
not insulate it from scrutiny. 143 Although it is virtually inarguable
that the first three-prongs of the modern constitutional conditional
spending test are met by this legislation, CIPA's constitutionality
hinges on the fourth prong, 144 depending on whether or not the
First Amendment is implicated.
B. Acquisition or Removal? Pico and the First Amendment
CIPA should not be invalidated on conditional spending
grounds because the use of filtering software in public libraries
does not implicate Pico145 or the First Amendment. Although the
Supreme Court's decision in Pico dealt with school libraries, Jus-
tice Brennan's plurality opinion interpreted the First Amendment
as forbidding government officials from removing books from a
school library because the officials disapproved of their subject
matter. 146  Importantly, the Court differentiated between the re-
moval and the acquisition of library materials, 147 stating "nothing
in our decision today affects in any way the discretion of a local
school board to choose books to add to the libraries of their
schools."'
148
As the defendants articulated in Mainstream Loudoun, 149 the
proper characterization of the Internet in a public library setting is
as a vast "Interlibrary Loan system. ' 5  Just as a library school
board decides not to acquire certain books or periodicals for its
shelves, the board may similarly decide not to acquire porno-
graphic websites by implementing filtering software. The filtering
software is wholly unrelated to a library's current collection of
143 See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (invalidating spending
program restrictions under the First Amendment); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (up-
holding spending program restrictions under the First Amendment).
I" See Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (stating that Congress may not use its spending power to
induce states to engage in unconstitutional activities).
145 See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 889 (1982) (Burger, J. dissenting) ("[Tlhere is
not a hint in the First Amendment, or in any holding of this Court, of a 'right' to have the gov-
emnment provide continuing access to certain books.").
146 Id. at 872.
147 Id. at 871.
148 Id.
'41 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 2 F. Supp. 2d. 783, 792 (E.D. Va. 1998) [Main-
stream Loudoun f].
150 Id. at 793.
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books and periodicals, thus the software should not be viewed as a
vehicle for removal. Historically, public librarians have exercised
their discretion when deciding whether to purchase bound library
materials,' 5 and as such, it follows that a new generation of li-
brarians should enjoy the same discretion in selecting appropriate
websites for library patrons. Modern technological advancements
in filtering software merely allow librarians to continue serving
their primary role in the community. A supplemental argument
may be made that the library is utilizing the filtering software to
select which types of materials to make publicly available.,51 By
not viewing the utilization of filtering software as a removal deci-
sion, the principles discussed in the Pico plurality are irrelevant in
evaluating CIPA's constitutionality.153 Therefore, the technology
protection measure requirement outlined in CIPA would be insu-
lated from First Amendment review.
Critics of filtering software, most notably the ALA, contend
that the government is inducing action with conditional spending
where an independent prohibition exists: the suppression of Inter-
net website operators' freedom of speech and the individual public
library patrons' freedom to receive information under the First
Amendment. 54 According to the critics, this attempt by Congress
to suppress private speech through conditional spending can best
be analogized to Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 155 a case in
which the Supreme Court invalidated a law that prohibited feder-
ally funded attorneys from making particular legal arguments that
were contrary to the desires of Congress. Neither situation in-
volves governmental speech, and as such, the ALA argues that
Congress has no authority to pen legislation that seeks to control
it, whether that be through the ideas and arguments of attorneys, or
through filtering software that controls what ideas and information
individuals are exposed to on the Internet.'
56
The ALA's most persuasive argument to invalidate CIPA on
First Amendment grounds entails characterizing the constraint on
speech as violating the right of library patrons to receive constitu-
tionally protected expression through viewing websites.'57 The
151 See ALA Library Bill of Rights, supra note 36.
52 See Semitsu, supra note 16, at 527.
13 Cf. Mainstream Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 794 (finding that Pico was relevant in this
case because it was classified as a removal decision).
15 See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the American Library As-
sociation, et al., at 4-5, Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(No. 01-1303) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Response Brief].
155 531 U.S. 533 (2000).
156 Plaintiffs' Response Brief, supra note 154, at 7.
15 Id. at 11.
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Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment
protects the right to receive ideas as well as to express them. 58
Most importantly, an individual's right to receive ideas applies to
constitutionally protected expression on the Internet,159 and in par-
ticular, at the public library.' 60 The ALA contends that the aims of
CIPA are not designed to disseminate or promote a governmental
message, but rather to hamper the transmission of private
speech.'6' Thus, the ALA concludes that CIPA implicates the First
Amendment, 62 which in turn serves as the independent prohibition
on Congress' blatant attempt to regulate speech through the "back
door."
In Mainstream Loudoun, Judge Brinkema analogized the
Internet to "a collection of encyclopedias" and likened the utiliza-
tion of filtering software to "redact[ing] portions deemed unfit for
library patrons."' 163 Characterizing the Board of Trustees' action as
a removal of library materials, Judge Brinkema applied Pico.164
The ALA finds support for Judge Brinkema's ill-advised reasoning
in studies on the evolution of the library, 165 and likewise draws a
parallel between the government removing books from a public
library's shelves and its utilization of filtering software on its
computers. The nature of the technology the public library em-
ploys is critical to drawing this parallel. The library's computer
terminals offer patrons a direct connection to the Internet; in other
words, the connection is always open to every site on the World
Wide Web. Therefore, to block a patron from viewing even one
website, pornographic or not, amounts to taking a book right off of
the shelf. This leads the ALA to the conclusion that CIPA's filter-
ing software requirement imposes content-based restrictions on
library patrons' receipt of information in a public place, thereby
infringing on individuals' First Amendment rights. 166
138 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867-68 (1982) (holding that a school
board cannot authorize the removal of books from a school library because it dislikes their con-
tent).
159 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-79 (1997) (finding that sexual expression on the
internet is protected by the First Amendment).
160 Plaintiffs' Response Brief, supra note 154, at 12 (noting that the right to receive infor-
mation has been protected in the context of public libraries); see Kreimer v. Bureau of Police,
958 F.2d 1242, 1255 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that the First Amendment includes the right to
receive information, and to some extent, the right to have access to public libraries).
161 Plaintiffs' Response Brief, supra note 154, at 7.
162 Id. at 11.
163 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793-94 (E.D. Va. 1998) [Main-
stream Loudoun 1].
164 ld. at 794.
165 See supra Part 11.
166 Plaintiffs' Response Brief, supra note 154, at 11.
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At the time the ALA filed its legal challenge, it was fortunate
to have the lone case deciding the constitutionality of Internet fil-
tering software on its side. However, the arguments of both the
ALA and Judge Brinkema ultimately fail. A public library may
enforce content-based restrictions on access to Internet speech
without violating the First Amendment; therefore, CIPA meets the
fourth-prong of the modern conditional spending framework
test. 167 Congress exercising its conditional spending power to in-
terfere with an individual's First Amendment right to receive in-
formation, through the use of Internet filtering software, is cer-
tainly not the traditional way the government regulates its general
citizenry. The Internet works in such a manner that librarians are
unable to make individual purchases of website material. The re-
sult would be axiomatic, if the Internet did function in such a
manner, that librarians could, purchase online pornography, be-
cause the bookshelf evidence shows us that librarians would de-
cline. CIPA's requirement of filtering software is an acquisition
question, and as such, the discretion of government officials
should control.
C. A Proper Analogy: Broadcasting and the First Amendment 68
Public libraries may use Internet filtering software to protect
children from pornography or other harmful material and remain
on solid constitutional ground. Similar to radio and television, the
Internet is routinely accessed by children, especially in the public
library setting.' 69  The Supreme Court has consistently acknowl-
edged that there exist "limitations on the otherwise absolute inter-
est of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the
speech is sexually explicit and the audience may include chil-
dren."'' 70 Prior to the advent of the Internet, the Court recognized
that broadcasting receives the most limited First Amendment pro-
tection,' 71 far less than that afforded the print media. 72 In FCC v.
167 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that a minimum drinking age
was a valid exercise of Congressional power when used to achieve highway safety).
168 See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101
(1993) (exploring the link between the philosophical failings of broadcast regulation and the
empirical failings of free speech theory).
169 Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (upholding an FCC ruling that a
daytime radio broadcast of comedian George Carlin's "Seven Filthy Words" routine was inde-
cent and could therefore be sanctioned).
170 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (holding inter alia that
the First Amendment does not prevent school districts from disciplining students for giving an
offensively lewd and indecent speech at an assembly).
171 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. "Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabu-
lary in an instant. Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the young without
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Pacifica Foundation, the Court bolstered the rationale for limiting
broadcasters' First Amendment protection by drawing two distinc-
tions between print and broadcast media. 173 The Court pointed to
broadcasting's "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans' ' 74 and its "[unique accessibility] to children, even
those too young to read."' 175  The Court justified regulating the
speech because "[p]atently offensive, indecent material ...con-
fronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the
home." 176 The Court reasoned that the ability to turn off the radio
or television set would not shield adults or children from inde-
cency because the exposure already would have taken place. 177
Following the decision, courts have narrowly construed Pacifica,
yet they continue to recognize it as justifying a government inter-
est in protecting children from indecent speech. 78 By extending
the broadcasting principles enunciated in Pacifica to the Internet,
the implementation of filtering software would eliminate chil-
dren's exposure to pornography in the public library setting.
Applying the Pacifica test to the Internet would reduce the
level of First Amendment protection our newest medium currently
enjoys and resolve the constitutionality of implementing filtering
software. First, is the Internet a "uniquely pervasive presence in
the lives of all Americans?"'' 79 Yes. A recent U.S. Department of
Commerce study revealed that 54% of Americans used the Internet
in 2001, up from 45% in 2000 and 22% in 1997.180 These in-
creases occurred among all races, income levels, and educational
backgrounds.181 The Internet's pervasiveness is highest in public
schools and libraries. 82 The study found that federal programs at
issue in CIPA have enabled more than 95% of public libraries and
restricting the expression at its source. Bookstores and motion picture theaters, for example,
may be prohibited from making indecent material available to children." Id. at 749.
172 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969) (discussing how differ-
ences in the characteristics of broadcasting justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to it).
17. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 749.
176 Id. at 748.
177 Id.
178 See, e..g., Sable Comm. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (declaring a statute banning
indecent dial-a-porn commercial telephone communications unconstitutional because a less
restrictive means to protect children existed).
179 Cf Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
180 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Econ. and Statistics Admin. & Nat'l Telecomm. and Info.
Admin., A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the Internet, Feb. 2002,
at 1, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/htmllanationonline2.htm.
181 Id. at 1-2.182 Id. at 40-4 1.
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98% of public schools to provide Internet access. 83 In addition,
90% of children between the ages of five and seventeen (or 48 mil-
lion children) now use computers.184 Assuming that 100% of chil-
dren are exposed to radio and television, the Department of Com-
merce study illustrates that the Internet is quickly closing the per-
vasiveness gap. The proper unit of analysis may be the Internet's
pervasiveness in the lives of everyday schoolchildren, and if this
were the case, the study would show a near equality in pervasive-
ness between the broadcast media and the Internet.
Second, is the Internet "uniquely accessible to children, even
those too young to read?"'' 85 Yes. The Department of Commerce
report noted that more than 75% of fourteen- to seventeen-year
olds and 38% of five- to nine-year-olds use the Internet at home or
school.1 86 Overall public library use is 29% for ten- to seventeen-
year-olds, who use the Internet at school, but not at home. 87 The
report found the Internet to be an increasingly common daily activ-
ity for children despite concerns of possible exposure of children
to unsafe or inappropriate content online.188  The empirical evi-
dence strongly suggests that applying the Pacifica test to the Inter-
net would result in a needed reduction in First Amendment protec-
tion, allowing CIPA's filtering software requirement to be free
from constitutional scrutiny. Most of all, it would protect the chil-
dren.
Stretching broadcasting's limited First Amendment protection
principles to encompass the Internet is not a proposal without dis-
senters.1 89 For example, Phillip H. Miller proposes that Pacifica
and Sable Communications, Inc. v. .FCC 190 set out a "spectrum of
intrusiveness" for electronic media.' 9' Criticisms of Internet regu-
lation, such as Miller's, are utterly unpersuasive because they fail
to acknowledge society's affirmative duty to protect its children. 
92
183 Id. at 39-41.
184 Id. at 42-56.
185 Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
186 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra note 180, at 42-56.
187 Id. at 52.
188 Id. at 53-54.
189 See, e.g., Philip H. Miller, Note, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First
Amendment Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147, 1201 (1993).
190 Sable Comm. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
191 Miller, supra note 189, at 1153-54. "At the farthest, most intrusive end of the spectrum
are broadcast services that arrive in the home unsolicited, providing viewers or listeners with
little prior warning or protection against unexpected program content. At the other, least intru-
sive end are services such as dial-a-porn and 'pay-per-view' that require some sort of initiating
act or intervention to trigger each transmission." Id. at 1154
192 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) ("State also has an independent
interest in the well-being of its youth.").
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The documented pervasiveness of the Internet increases the
chances that a child will be exposed to indecent material. Internet
filtering software would protect a child when an adult decides to
view obscene material, child pornography, or material harmful to
minors. Child pornography is a type of expression not protected
by the First Amendment,193 but without filtering software, a child
may unwillingly be exposed to such visual depictions at a public
library. Thanks to Pacifica, parents are assured that their children
will not encounter indecent material through the broadcast media
during daytime hours. Unless Pacifica is extended to the Internet,
danger is only one click away.
D. Forum Shopping: Strictly Intermediate Scrutiny
Assuming that Internet filtering software implicates the First
Amendment, a library is a non-public forum, and as such, any
regulation should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. In evaluat-
ing the level of First Amendment protection afforded to an indi-
vidual exercising his free speech rights on governmental property,
the Supreme Court has identified and developed three distinct
categories: traditional public, limited public, and non-public
fora. 194 First, a traditional public forum is a government property
that has been dedicated to speech "by long tradition or by govern-
ment fiat."' 95 Public sidewalks, parks, and streets are the most fre-
quently cited examples of traditional public fora. 196 In making a
traditional public forum determination, courts generally consider
the history of a site's openness to the public for all forms of ex-
pressive activity.197 If the government attempts to restrict speech
based on content in a traditional public forum, courts will apply
strict scrutiny. 98 It is axiomatic that a public library is not a tradi-
tional public forum. In a public library, patrons must suppress cer-
tain forms of expressive activity while on the premises, such as
making speeches, holding rallies, or distributing written materials.
These manifestations of expression would enjoy First Amendment
protection on a sidewalk or in a park, but would undermine the
library's purpose and mission. In Mainstream Loudoun, Judge
19. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 105, 108 (1989) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 762 (1982)) ("the value of permitting child pornography has been characterized as
'exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.'").
194 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
195 Id; see also Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998)
("Designated public fora ... are created by purposeful governmental action.").
196 Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974).
197 See, e.g., Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 672 U.S. 679, 681 (1992).
198 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
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Brinkema clearly- articulated that a public library could not be con-
sidered a traditional public forum because libraries in the county
had not been traditionally open to the public for all forms of ex-
pressive activity.99
Second, a limited, or designated, public forum is defined as
"public property which the State has opened for use by the public
as a place for expressive activity., 200  One example is a school
board meeting or municipal theater.20 1 In Kreimer v. Bureau of
Police,2 °2 the lone case that has confronted the public library forum
question, the Court ruled that the public library is a limited public
forum. In Kreimer, a homeless man challenged a New Jersey pub-
lic library's rules governing patron behavior and personal hygiene
because library personnel jettisoned him from the premises numer-
ous times due to his disruptive manner and offensive body odor.20 3
The Third Circuit considered three factors: government intent, ex-
tent of use, and nature of the forum;2°4 it upheld all of the chal-
lenged regulations.2 5
In Mainstream Loudoun, Judge Brinkema relied on Kreimer,
applied the Third Circuit's three-factored test, and found the Lou-
doun County libraries to be limited public fora. 206 This decision
was erroneous. Kreimer should not have been relied on in Main-
stream Loudoun, and should not be relied on in evaluating the
level of scrutiny to be given to CIPA's filtering software require-
ment. The case failed to make a determination about the discretion
that librarians enjoy when making acquisition decisions, but Judge
Brinkema read that into the Kreimer holding. Applying the three-
factored test, in opening public libraries, neither the Loudoun
County nor the United States government created a public forum
through any actions or expressed an intent to do so. Merely au-
thorizing the opening of public library systems fails to meet the
more rigorous intent test. As for extent of use, public libraries uni-
formly impose a great variety of restrictions on the use of their
computer systems and bound collections; they do not limit the li-
brary personnel's own discretion to restrict access. Simply be-
cause a public library proclaims in a resolution that the library is
199 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 562 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("The only issue before us, then, is whether
the library is a limited public forum or a non-public forum.").
200 Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
201 See Mainstream Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
202 958 F.2d 1242, 1262 (1992).
203 Id. at 1247.
204 id. at 1259-60.
205 Id. at 1246.
206 Mainstream Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
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for the use of "the people, 2 °7 it does not follow that all aspects of
the library are available to the general public. Lastly, the nature of
the public library is not compatible with a number of expressive
activities, including "giving speeches or holding rallies" 20 8 as well
as receiving indecent, obscene, or pornographic information on the
Internet.
Third, the non-public forum is not "by tradition or designation
a forum for public communication" 2 9 and is dedicated to non-
communicative uses. The government may exclude rallies,
marches, and other interactive activities on properties such as mili-
tary bases, polling places, airport terminals, and prisons. 2  In a
non-public forum, the government functions similarly to a private
owner, and thus retains the power to preserve the property under
its control for the use to which it is "lawfully dedicated., 21 ' Al-
though some communicative activities inarguably take place on the
property, public libraries should be considered non-public fora.
There is Supreme Court precedent in support of this conten-
tion. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education
212Fund, the Court held that a charity drive aimed at federal em-
ployees allowing them to make donations to select organizations
constituted a non-public forum. Similar to the public library set-
ting, in Cornelius, the government did not affirmatively open the
forum to general participation.1 3 Public libraries are simply de-
signed to voluntarily provide members of the community with ma-
terials necessary for both convenience, educational, and recrea-
tional purposes. Similar to the government's decision to provide
"health, comfort and convenience" at military exchanges, 21 4 public
library personnel select materials for purchase and make them
available to library visitors. An individual blocked from
downloading indecent material, obscenity, or child pornography at
a public library is not restricted from engaging in expressive activ-
ity; instead, the patron is merely prevented from viewing material
that library personnel have chosen not to acquire or purchase.
Since the public library should be construed as a non-public
forum, CIPA's Internet filtering requirement should be subject to
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
230 See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
211 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
232 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
233 Bell, supra note 32, at 203.
214 See General Media Comm. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 280 (2d Cir. 1997) (upholding the
Military Honor and Decency Act of 1996, which banned the sale or rental of sexually explicit
material at military exchanges, and finding the exchanges to be a non-public forum).
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intermediate scrutiny. Thus, a reviewing body should examine
whether the regulation is "reasonably related to an important gov-
ernmental interest., 21 5  As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has
long recognized that the government has a constitutionally justi-
fied interest in protecting its children.216 Due to the proliferation
of pornographic materials and the increasing number of children
using the Internet at public libraries,2 7 it is axiomatic that utilizing
filtering software to eliminate their exposure is a reasonable meas-
ure. It is inarguable that CIPA's filtering requirement would sur-
vive intermediate scrutiny.
One of the most critical mistakes made by Judge Brinkema in
Mainstream Loudoun was to apply strict scrutiny in assessing the
legality of a mandatory filtering policy.21 8  In its challenge to
CIPA's constitutionality, the ALA agrees with Judge Brinkema
and contends that since a public library is either a traditional or
limited public forum voluntarily brought into existence by the
government, a court must examine the filtering policy to determine
whether it is "narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state in-
terest., 219 Although CIPA is not technically a mandatory filtering
policy, the fact that Congress has essentially offered public librar-
ies a Hobson's choice by conditioning vital funds on the imple-
mentation of the filtering software, 220 the ALA believes courts
should view it as mandatory and analyze CIPA under strict scru-
tiny.221 This is illustrated by the fact that, without the benefit of
the federal funds at issue in CIPA, a majority of public libraries
would be financially unable to provide Internet access.222
E. Surviving Strict Scrutiny: How Effective is Effective Enough?
Assuming that a court were to side with Judge Brinkema and
Kreimer, construe the library as a limited public forum, and apply
strict scrutiny, CIPA's content-based speech restriction would still
survive because the legislation at hand proscribes the least restric-
tive means for achieving compelling governmental goals. The
215 See Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561 (E.D. Va. 1998)
[Mainstream Loudoun 11].
216 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) (affirming defendant's
conviction under New York law for selling "girlie" magazines to a sixteen-year-old).
217 U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 180, at 42-43.
218 See Mainstream Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (arguing that the applicable "limita-
tion of adult access to constitutionality protected materials cannot survive strict scrutiny").
219 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (holding
that preferential access to an interschool mail system does not violate the First Amendment).
220 Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 29-30.
221 Plaintiffs' Response Brief, supra note 154, at 4-5.
222 Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 8, at 29-30.
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goals stated by the defendant school board in Mainstream Loudoun
are equally applicable to libraries on a national scale: "minimizing
access to illegal pornography and avoidance of creation of a sexu-
ally hostile environment.
The Supreme Court has accepted the argument that minimiz-
ing children's access to indecent, obscene, and pornographic mate-
rials is a compelling governmental interest. 224 It is the strongest
and most persuasive argument in support of CIPA's requirement of
filtering software. Although the legislation at issue is aimed at
public libraries, and not schools, the filtering software's primary
purpose is nonetheless to protect children from harmful material.
The government is acting well within its constitutional authority
when it attempts to minimize the chances that children may be ex-
posed to harmful websites. In Sable Communications, Inc., the
Supreme Court ruled that obscenity and child pornography do not
warrant First Amendment protection225 and stated that the govern-
ment may even shield children from material falling short of le-
gally obscene. 26 Furthermore, in Reno v. ACLU, the Court
stressed that the protection of children's physical and psychologi-
cal well being is a compelling interest 227 while adding that since
the use of the Internet to transmit child pornography and obscene
material is a violation of federal law, filtering software that blocks
such transmissions would also serve as a compelling governmental
228interest. Furthermore, neither the plaintiffs nor Judge Brinkema
in Mainstream Loudoun denied that "minimizing access to illegal
pornography and avoidance of creation of a sexually hostile envi-
ronment" were compelling governmental interests. 229 Therefore, a
court reviewing CIPA's filtering policy should follow the princi-
ples illustrated in Sable, Reno, and Mainstream Loudoun and de-
termine that the compelling interest prong of the strict scrutiny test
is satisfied.
223 Mainstream Loudoun I1, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 565.
224 See e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755 (1996)
(agreeing with the argument that "protection of children is a 'compelling interest,' while dis-
agreeing with the assertion that 'segregate and block' requirements properly accommodate the
speech restrictions they impose and the legitimate objective they seek to attain.").
225 Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989) ("[W]e hold today that
there is no constitutional stricture against Congress' prohibiting the interstate transmission of
obscene commercial telephone recordings.").
226 Id. at 126 ("We have recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from
the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.").
227 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997).
228 Id. at 877 n.44; see also Semitsu, supra note 16, at 537-38.
229 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 565 (E.D. Va. 1998) [Main-
stream Loudoun 11].
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Assuming a court was to find a compelling governmental in-
terest, Supreme Court precedent dictates that under strict scrutiny,
CIPA's content-based regulation must be narrowly tailored to fit
that compelling interest.23° If a reviewing court were to find that
less restrictive measures or alternatives would be as effective in
meeting this compelling interest, then CIPA's policy would be in-
validated.23' CIPA's critics believe that the legislation's downfall
resides in this analysis. They rely on the fact that empirical evi-
dence shows that even the newest and most technologically ad-
vanced filtering software is imperfect at screening out indecent or
obscene websites, and websites that are harmful to minors. 32 The
key question is, how close to perfect does the filtering software
have to be at screening out this troublesome material?
A court must decide how effective, percentage-wise, the fil-
tering software has to be in order to meet the government's com-
pelling interest of minimizing children's exposure to pornographic
material. A court must also examine alternative policies that li-
braries can imlplement in order to achieve the same goal of protect-
ing children. 3 Finally, a court must determine the net residual
difference between CIPA's filtering policy and the alternative
means available, if any, and decide if the difference is great
enough that the filtering policy is truly the least restrictive way to
meet the compelling governmental interest. The major obstacle in
this proposed analysis is that it is difficult to quantify the effec-
tiveness of "tap-on-the-shoulder policies" and privacy screens.
Judge Brinkema evaluated this by referring to the minute number
of documented problems arising in public libraries utilizing such
alternative policies in Loudoun County, the state of Virginia, and
234across the country. This is a simplistic and dangerously narrow
approach to determining the effectiveness of alternative, less re-
strictive means of meeting the government's compelling interest.
Judge Brinkema's approach fails to account for unreported viola-
tions of the alternative policies, the level of enforcement of these
230 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) ("For the
state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.").
231 Id.
232 Digital Chaperones, supra note 87, at 22-23.
233 Mainstream Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 567. Judge Brinkema found that less restric-
tive means were available to the library, such as installing filtering software on only certain
Internet terminals limited to minors, using privacy screens, and employing casual monitoring of
Internet use by library staff members. Id.
234 Id. at 566 (stating that there had been only "three isolated incidents nationally, one very
minor isolated incident in Virginia, no evidence whatsoever of problems in Loudoun County,
and not a single employee complaint from anywhere in the country").
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policies, and the general moral problems that can be associated
with young children viewing obscene and pornographic material
that may manifest themselves in violence or family disruption in
the future.
However misguided and ill-advised Judge Brinkema's analy-
sis may have been, she was correct that the inadequacy of the cur-
rent state of filtering software falls short of guaranteeing perfec-
tion.235 Judge Brinkema and CIPA's critics miss the main point:
the filtering software does not have to be perfect to minimize chil-
dren's exposure to pornography. As the defendants in Mainstream
Loudoun articulated, the only alternative to implementing filtering
software is "to have librarians directly monitor what patrons
view. 236 This type of restriction would be "far more intrusive
than using filtering software,', 237 would be more expensive, would
increase the likelihood of physical altercations, and would un-
doubtedly still be imperfect. In addition, PICS ratings-based soft-
ware has been incorporated and improved upon by companies such
as Microsoft, Netscape, and AOL, and there is guarded optimism
that near-perfection may be attained in the future.2 38 Therefore, in
analyzing CIPA, a court should rule that Internet filtering software
is the most effective means of reducing children's exposure to in-
decent, obscene, and harmful material, and that a less restrictive
method to meet the government's compelling interest simply does
not exist.
F. The Filtering Mandate and Disabling Provisions
1. Block One, Block All
Assuming CIPA's filtering software requirement implicates
the First Amendment and is subject to strict scrutiny, the govern-
ment will have a difficult time justifying the extensive restrictions
on public libraries that must be complied with in order to receive
the funds at issue. As noted earlier, in order to receive "E-rate"
discounts and LSTA funds,239 public libraries must certify that a
technology protection measure, or filtering software, is utilized at
all times, on all library terminals with Internet access, during use
by both adults and minors. 240 The ALA finds CIPA's requirement
235 See Digital Chaperones, supra note 87, at 22-23.
236 Mainstream Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
237 Id.
238 Sernitsu, supra note 16, at 517.
239 See supra note 21.
240 CIPA, supra note 17, § 254(h).
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for the implementation of the filtering software on computers
bought by the library, without the use of these funds, particularly
troublesome. 24' A simple example is helpful to illustrate this
point. Picture a rural public library housing two computers. The
library purchased the first computer with its own funds, or through
a private contribution, and likewise paid for the computer's Inter-
net access. Meanwhile, the library purchased the second computer
and an additional line for Internet access courtesy of an "E-rate"
discount or the LSTA funds. Under CIPA, the library would be
forced to utilize the Internet filtering software on both computers;
otherwise, it would be ineligible for any future funding. This
leaves a library with a decision of either imposing content-based
restrictions on all of its computers, which may be against the will
of the library's particular community, or losing the funds, thereby
rendering it unable to provide Internet access to members of that
same community.
2. Chilling Provisions
CIPA's drafters recognized the constitutional vulnerability of
this overbroad restriction on speech, as well the imperfections of
current Internet filtering software, and attempted to safeguard
CIPA's chances of being invalidated on constitutional grounds.
Therefore, they attached "disabling provisions" to sections 1712
and 1721, which provide that library administrators may disable
the filtering software for "bona fide research or other lawful pur-
pose[s]. 242  Through these provisions, Congress reconciled its
stated compelling governmental interest of "protecting children
from exposure to sexually explicit material, 243 with the reality that
filtering software may prevent adults from conducting computer
research on sensitive topics. The ALA criticizes this as a vague
and ambiguous directive as to when the software disabling should
take place; argues that the provision places Article III power in the
hands of librarians; 244 and points out that librarians may deny le-
gitimate, lawful requests to disable the filtering software.245 The
ALA paints the librarians' decisions as "neither constrained by any
defined standards nor reviewable by a court," thus cutting against
24 Plaintiffs' Response Brief, supra note 154, at 10 (stating that libraries would have to
block speech on computers that were paid for with non-federal money).
242 CIPA, supra note 17, § 1721(b).
243 S. REP. No. 106-141, at 7 (1999).
24 Plaintiffs' Response Brief, supra note 154, at 26 (noting that CIPA allows but does not
require library authorities to disable Internet filtering software).
245 Id.
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246our founding principles of law. The ALA also asserts that the
disabling provisions may serve to chill the constitutionally pro-
tected speech of individual library users.247
Consider the silver-haired grandfather figure depicted in the
opening of this Note. The Internet filtering software would re-
strain him from viewing potential constitutionally protected speech
on his chosen website.248 Furthermore, considering his age and
possible stature in the upper-middle-class community, the dis-
abling provisions may deter and chill his pursuit of alternative life-
style information. It is highly unlikely that the elderly gentleman
will volunteer to the librarians that he would like to view a website
that depicts pornographic homosexual acts. Even if he makes such
a request, a librarian would then have to decide if disabling the
filtering software would serve a "bona fide research or other law-
ful purpose. 249  Furthermore, the librarian may maintain a bias
against homosexuals and improperly refuse a legitimate, lawful
request to disable the software. The ALA argues that CIPA's
vagueness with respect to the disabling provisions, the grant of
plenary power to the librarians in making constitutional decisions,
and the impermissible negative chill that results should cause
CIPA's downfall.
While the ALA's position is moderately persuasive, the draft-
ers of the legislation at issue were on solid constitutional ground
when they included the disabling provisions. The legislators were
cognizant of Urofsky v. Gilmore, 25 a timely Fourth Circuit deci-
sion upholding on First Amendment grounds, a Virginia statute
designed to prohibit state employees from accessing sexually ex-
plicit material on the state's computers without prior permission.
The court reasoned that the state as an employer enjoys wider First
Amendment latitude when it regulates the speech of its employees
than it does when it restricts the speech of the general citizenry.251
Commentators have agreed that Urofsky will be read by courts re-
viewing the constitutionality of CIPA's disabling provisions as an
endorsement of the request procedures outlined in sections 1712
246 Id.; see Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) ("The First
Amendment prohibits the vesting of such unbridled discretion in a government official.").
247 Plaintiffs' Response Brief, supra note 154, at 23 (noting that the Supreme Court has
recognized the chilling effect on forcing citizens to request access to disfavored, but constitu-
tionally protected speech); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727,
754 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court has recognized the chilling effect of forcing citizens
to request access to disfavored, but constitutionally protected, speech).
248 See Bastian, supra note 6.
249 CIPA, supra note 17, § 254(h).
25 167 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1999).
251 Id. at 194.
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and 1721, and that librarians will be permitted to use their discre-
tion in determining whether a patron is legitimately attempting to
access a website for a "bona fide research or other lawful pur-
pose.
252
G. Secondary Effects: Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
There is more than one way for CIPA's Internet filtering
software requirement to be upheld as constitutional. The above
analysis suggests that utilizing filtering software in a public library
will pass constitutional muster under a content-based restriction
test. The same end can be reached by characterizing the filtering
software in a constitutionally opposite light, without addressing
the content of the Internet material. Libraries may utilize the fil-
tering software as a time, place, and manner restriction, which in
turn triggers intermediate scrutiny. In Mainstream Loudoun, the
defendants unsuccessfully relied on City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres253 in mounting their argument on this issue. 254 In Renton,
the Supreme Court held that a city zoning ordinance that prohib-
ited adult movie theaters from locating within 1000 feet of
neighborhoods and churches, which was designed to prevent the
occurrence of harmful secondary effects, was a content-neutral
time, place, and manner restriction. 255 The Court stated that the
ordinance properly addressed the secondary effects of the adult
theaters, such as preserving the quality of the neighborhoods, pre-
venting crime, and protecting retail trade.25 6 The Court ruled that
the ordinance could be justified without reference to the content of
the speech in the adult theaters.257 Most importantly, the Court
pointed out that the content of the movies was unrelated to the
harmful secondary effects, even to the effect of decreasing prop-
erty values. 25 8 Although a more recent Supreme Court ruling inti-
mated that blanket restrictions on speech may not be analyzed as
time, place, and manner regulations,25 9 the Court has never ex-
pressly overruled Renton.
The secondary effects resulting from public libraries provid-
ing unfettered access to Internet pornography are numerous. Li-
252 See Conn, supra note 99, at 491-92.
-3 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
25 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564-65 (E.D. Va. 1998)
[Mainstream Loudoun 11].
255 Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
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brary patrons downloading and displaying graphics uses consider-
able amounts of computer resources. 260 Pornographic newsgroups
commandeer large amounts of limited bandwidth on a library's
computer network, resulting in slower connectivity for other li-
brary patrons.26' In addition, the secondary effects propounded by
defendants in Mainstream Loudoun - preventing a "sexually hos-
tile environment" from developing on the premises 262 and comply-
ing with "obscenity, child pornography, and harm to juveniles
laws" - are highly persuasive. 263 The jump from adult movie thea-
ters to Internet pornography is not a long one. If the Supreme
Court can wholly ignore the content of adult movie theaters while
restricting the owner's right to operate a business, there should not
be a moment's hesitation in declaring Internet filtering software a
content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.
VIII. JUDGMENT DAY
On May 31, 2002, one month before public libraries were
supposed to certify their compliance with CIPA's requirements,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania issued its ruling in American Library Association v.
United States.26 Chief Circuit Judge Edward R. Becker relied on
the inadequacy of Internet filtering software and the resultant
"overblocking" of constitutionally protected speech, and declared
that CIPA sections 1712(a)(2) and 1721(b) to be facially invalid
under the First Amendment.265 The court held that CIPA requires
libraries to violate their patrons' First Amendment rights,266 and it
further held that the disabling provisions failed to cure the consti-
tutional defects.267 The court declined to rule on whether CIPA's
filtering requirement constitutes an unconstitutional condition, but
indicated that the ALA presented highly persuasive arguments on
the issue.268 In addition, the court failed to reach the plaintiffs'
alternative theories of invalidity: CIPA's function as a prior re-
straint on speech and its language being unconstitutionally
vague. 269 Judge Becker offered extensive findings of fact regard-
260 Semitsu, supra note 16, at 528.
261 Id.
262 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564 (E.D. Va. 1998) [Main-
stream Loudoun 11].
263 Id.
264 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
265 Id. at 479.
266 Id. at 490.
267 Id. at 489.
268 Id. at 490 n.36.
269 Id. at 490.
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ing the Internet, filtering software, and public libraries, and thor-
oughly articulated his reasoning, but he clearly missed the point:
the filtering software does not have to be perfect.
A. Findings of Fact
1. The Internet in Public Libraries
In his extensive factual findings, Judge Becker unveiled four
interests that motivate public libraries to implement Internet use
policies.270 First, libraries have attempted to protect patrons, chil-
dren in particular, from viewing harmful material that other pa-
trons are viewing.2 7 1 Second, libraries have shaped their policies
to protect patrons from accidentally accessing sexual material.272
Third, libraries have actively sought to block patrons from inten-
tionally downloading sexually explicit or inappropriate material. 3
Fourth, libraries have enforced use policies seeking to prevent
harmful secondary effects that result from patrons viewing unac-
ceptable material. 74 In order to serve these interests, libraries in-
stalled privacy screens, deployed filtering software, established
links to "recommended websites," created a "Library Channel, 275
installed "recessed monitors, 2 76 and constructed children-only ac-
cess areas. 2 77 By articulating what may be viewed as compelling
governmental interests, and then listing virtually every known al-
ternative to filtering software, Judge Becker laid the foundation for
CIPA's downfall.
2. Internet Filtering Technology
Judge Becker tipped his hand in discussing filtering software
alternatives, and his evaluation and criticism of current Internet
filtering software slammed the constitutional door shut on CIPA.
The court reviewed the most popular network-based filters used in
public libraries: SurfControl's Cyber Patrol, N2H2's Bess/i2100,
Secure Computing's SmartFilter, and Websense.278 In describing
270 Id. at 423.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 424-25. The Westerville, Ohio Library utilized this service which restricted chil-
dren's Internet access to a group of 2000-3000 websites selected by the library's staff. Id.
276 Id. at 425. "Recessed monitors are computer screens that sit below the level of a desk
top and are viewed from above." Id.
277 Id. at 424-26.
278 Id. at 427. The functioning of these filtering programs is discussed in Part III.
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the methods filtering software companies use in developing their
"control lists, ' 279 Judge Becker credited the opinion of plaintiffs'
expert Dr. Geoffrey Nunberg and stated:
First, they [filtering software companies] must collect or
"harvest" the relevant URLs from the vast number of sites
that exist on the Web. Second, they must sort through the
URLs they have collected to determine under which of the
company's self-defined categories (if any), they should be
classified.28°
Judge Becker assumed that these two phases result in a
"tradeoff between overblocking28' ...and underblocking '282 and
criticized each phase individually. First, the judge stated that the
"harvesting" phase, consisting of software companies utilizing
search engines to identify websites for classification purposes, suf-
fers from numerous limitations and leads to substantial under-
blocking.283 These limitations include the impossibility of search
engines to recognize Deep Web sites and their inability to search
images. 284 This inability to search URLs by images throttled Judge
Becker, in light of the fact that CIPA only covers "visual depic-
,,285tions. Second, the judge expressed his displeasure with the
"winnowing" or categorization phase, which consists of filtering
software companies utilizing key word analysis tools to evaluate
the content of harvested Web sites and then categorizing them.286
The court stressed the limitations of keyword-based filters, includ-
ing the fact that "no string of words can identify all sites that con-
tain sexually explicit content," which leads to underblocking and
287overblocking. In addition, the court found that the human re-
view of websites employed by the software companies is theoreti-
cally a good idea, but is ultimately ineffective due to limited staff-
ing and the explosive Internet growth rate.288
279 Id. at 428.
280 Id. at 430.
281 Id. at 430-31. The court defined overblocking as "the blocking of content that does not
meet the category definitions established by CIPA or by the filtering software companies." Id.
282 Id. at 431. The court defined underblocking as "leaving off of a control list a URL that
contains content that would meet the category definitions defined by CIPA or the filtering soft-
ware companies." Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 432.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 433. The court added that the Internet's explosive growth prevents software
companies from reviewing sites or pages already categorized, resulting in even more overblock-
ing. Id. at 435-36.
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The court attempted to justify its criticism of the software
companies' methods by attempting to quantify underblocking and
overblocking rates. Interestingly, Judge Becker noted the diffi-
culty involved in calculating these rates, 289 and then proceeded to
discredit the government expert witness' study and testimony.29°
The judge disapproved of one of the government's expert wit-
nesses, Cory Finnell's, methodology in studying Internet logs of
three public libraries, and concluded that Finnell understated un-
derblocking and overblocking rates. Judge Becker went so far as
to state that Finnell's 6%-15% estimated range of overblocking
rates "states the lower bounds" of the actual rates. 291 The judge
was much more eager to credit a study by expert witness Benjamin
Edelman, who fed a list of 500,000 URLs through the four filtering
programs, and found that 6777 URLs were erroneously blocked by
one or more of the programs.292 The erroneously blocked web
sites related to religion, career, politics, education, travel, sports,
and health.293
3. Factual Conclusions
The court found that current Internet filtering software prod-
ucts are incapable of blocking sexually explicit content without
also blocking a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
speech.94 According to Judge Becker, even the most effective
product blocks "countless thousands of Web pages, the content of
which does not match the filtering company's category definitions,
much less the legal definitions of obscenity, child pornography, or
harmful to minors. 295
The court stated further that filtering software wrongfully
blocks "tens of thousands" of Web pages, a number that increases
exponentially when adults are blocked from viewing material not
obscene or child pornography.296 Judge Becker then pronounced
that there is no technology in existence today that can judge if a
visual depiction is legally obscene, child pornography, or harmful
to minors, and that there will not be one in the near future.297 That
is certainly true, but requiring computer software to make legal
289 See id. at 437 ("The fundamental problem with calculating over- and under-blocking
rates is selecting a universe of websites or web pages to serve as the set to be tested.").
290 Id. at 439-40.
291 Id. at 442.
292 Id. at 443.
293 Id. at 446-47.
294 Id. at 448.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 449.
297 Id.
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judgments is another prime example of Judge Becker's unrealistic
expectations and utopian reasoning.
B. Level of Scrutiny
After applying South Dakota v. Dole and finding that a public
library can never comply with CIPA without also blocking consti-
tutionally protected speech,298 the court began its analysis to de-
termine if CIPA's filtering software requirement offended the First
Amendment. 299  The court stated at the outset that the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group300 supported the proposition that content-based restrictions,
such as software filters, are subject to strict scrutiny. 30 1 However,
the court also noted that if the restriction applies only on govern-
ment-owned and controlled public libraries, strict scrutiny may be
inapplicable. 30 2 In order to determine the appropriate level of scru-
tiny, the court first attempted to answer the forum question.3 3
1. The "Vast Democratic Forum"304
Judge Becker believed that the relevant forum should be de-
fined by the specific access sought by the plaintiffs, and not by the
physical limits of the government property.30 5 In a public library
setting, the forum distinction is drawn between "the library's col-
lection as a whole [and] the library's provision of Internet ac-
cess.' 306 The court found that since the rights at issue in the case
centered on accessing and publishing information on the Internet,
the relevant forum was the one created by the library when it pro-
vided patrons access to the World Wide Web.30 7 Judge Becker
quickly dismissed the government's argument that a public library
constitutes a non-public forum, similar to an airport terminal, mili-
tary base, or public transit vehicle, and ruled that a public library is
a designated or limited public forum.30 8 The judge reasoned that a
public library's purpose of providing Internet access is to allow for
298 Id. at 450-51 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-10 (1987)).
299 Id. at 453.
3- 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (holding that content-based speech restrictions in relation to
cable television broadcasts must satisfy strict scrutiny).
301 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
302 Id. (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1991)).
30- Id. at 454.
304 Id. at 464; see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S 844, 868 (1997).
305 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 455-56 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985)).
106 Id. at 455.
307 Id. at 456.
308 Id. at 457.
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dissemination and reception of information, which is expressive
activity easily analogized to a university meeting facility, school
board meeting, or municipal theater.3°
2. Acquisition or Removal?
The government's rational basis review argument that filter-
ing software is a content-based restriction on speech, utilized by a
library for the narrowly specified purpose of making decisions
about which Internet content to make publicly available, fell on
deaf ears.3 1° Judge Becker was not receptive to the government's
astute and proper analogy that a library's decision to "acquire
books about gardening but not golf," subject only to rational basis
review, is no different that its decisions selecting which Web sites
library patrons may be allowed to view.311 The court spelled out
the First Amendment difference between using Internet filters and
the editorial decisions involved in selecting certain books:
[B]y providing patrons with even filtered Internet access, the
library permits patrons to receive speech on a virtually unlim-
ited number of topics, from a virtually unlimited number of
speakers, without attempting to restrict patrons' access to
speech that the library, in the exercise of its professional
judgment, determines to be particularly valuable. 
3 2
The court distinguished CIPA's filtering requirement from
cases upholding the government's right to restrict speech, based on
the fact that a governmental actor, such as a librarian, does not re-
view the disfavored Internet content. 313 In so doing, the court dis-
regarded testimony by librarians, who stated under oath that they
apply the same standard in choosing print materials as they do in
selecting appropriate websites for patrons, and found that provid-
ing Internet access opens library doors to "vast amounts of speech"
unsuitable for a library's print collection.314 The court also rea-
soned that the Internet is a forum open to anyone in the world,
309 Id.
310 Id. at457-61.
"I Id. The court did agree, however, that a public library's controversial decision to pur-
chase the works of Shakespeare instead of John Grisham novels would be subject to rational
basis review. Id. at 462.
312 Id. at 462.
311 Id.; see Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (holding that a
statute requiring the NEA to ensure that grant applications are judged on artistic merit and ex-
cellence, and also to consider decency and respect for diverse views, did not interfere with First
Amendment rights).
314 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
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while a library's print collection is limited to speakers evaluated
and subsequently chosen by human librarians.315
In determining the limitations on the government's power in a
public library, the court stated that "the more narrow the range of
speech the government chooses to subsidize . . . the more defer-
ence the First Amendment accords the government. 31 6 According
to the court, since the government's use of the Internet opens pub-
lic libraries for broad, diverse speech by the public and designates
the fora for expressive activity, the government's use of filtering
software to exclude particular disfavored speech triggers strict
scrutiny. 31 Interestingly, the court distinguished the basis for its
view, that restrictions on a library's print collection are different
than restrictions on Internet access, from the rationale expressed
by the court in Mainstream Loudoun.1 8 In that case, Judge
Brinkema based the distinction on the lack of time and resources
required to view a World Wide Web site, as compared with the
money and shelf-space needed for print materials.1 9 Judge Becker
disagreed with that approach, and inexplicably focused on the
amount of time patrons must wait to use library computers: "Just
as the scarcity of a library's budget and shelf space constrains a
library's ability to provide its patrons with unrestricted access to
print materials, the scarcity of time at Internet terminals constrains
libraries' ability to provide patrons with unrestricted Internet ac-
cess."
320
In order to further justify his application of strict scrutiny,
Judge Becker distinguished CIPA's filtering software requirement
from the government actions in Rust v. Sullivan,32' Arkansas Edu-
cation Television Communication v. Forbes,322 and National En-
dowment for the Arts v. Finley,323 and instead analogized the ac-
315 Id.
316 Id. at 458.
317 Id. at 461. The court compared CIPA's exclusion, or "singling out," of private speech
in a public library to discriminatory taxes on the press. Id.; see Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (holding that Arkansas' publishing tax scheme of taxing gen-
eral interest magazines but exempting newspapers and religious, professional, trade, and sportsjournals, violates the First Amendment).
318 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 465 n.25.
3'9 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793-94 (E.D. Va. 1998) [Main-
stream Loudoun 1].
320 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 465 n.25.
321 500 U.S. 173 (1990) (reviewing HHS regulation prohibiting Title X of the Public
Health Service Act from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and activities advocating
abortion as a method of family planning).
322 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (holding that state-owned public television broadcasting exclusion
of an independent political candidate from a debate did not violate the First Amendment be-
cause the debate was a non-public forum).323 524 U.S. 569 (1998); see also text accompanying note 313.
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tions to those in Rosenberger v. Rector &Visitors,324 City of Madi-
son Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, 32 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,2 6 FCC
v. League of Women Voters,327 and Legal Services Corp. v. Ve-
lazquez.328 329 Finally, the judge bolstered his decision by depict-
ing the Internet as a modern-day sidewalk, public park, or town
square, and declaring that all are subject to the same level of scru-
tiny.33°
C. Application of Strict Scrutiny
1. Compelling Interests
In the court's view, the government's interests of preventing
the dissemination of obscenity, child pornography, and material
harmful to minors were on solid constitutional ground.33' In find-
ing these interests to be compelling, Judge Becker relied on Su-
preme Court precedent recognizing a compelling interest in pro-
tecting the well being of minors, specifically cases upholding laws
criminalizing the possession and distribution of child pornography,
and the distribution of harmful material to minors. 332 The court
found that protecting the unwilling viewer from offensive, non-
obscene material has never been recognized as a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and, as a result, ruled that a public library
"might have a compelling interest in protecting library patrons and
staff from unwilling exposure. 3 33 However, the court rejected that
preventing patrons' unlawful or inappropriate conduct, such as
public masturbation and harassment of the library staff, could
serve as a compelling interest. 334 Thus, the court felt that as long
3- 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that university denial of funds to Christian newspaper
violated the First Amendment because it amounted to viewpoint discrimination).
'- 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (holding that a school board could not prevent teachers' union
from speaking in opposition to an agency shop proposition at a public school board meeting).
32 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (holding that respondent municipal board's rejection of allegedly
obscene theatrical production constituted a prior restraint).
327 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (finding unconstitutional a section of the 1967 Public Broadcasting
Act that forbid any noncommercial educational broadcasting station receiving a grant from the
Corporation of Public Broadcasting to "engage in editorializing.").
328 531 U.S. 533 (2000) (holding unconstitutional Legal Services Corporation funding
restriction prohibiting the making of certain legal claims).
329 Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 465-66 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(holding that the law must serve a compelling state interest, be narrowly tailored in furtherance
of that interest, and be no more restrictive than necessary).
330 Id. at 470.
331 Id. at 471-72.
332 Id. at 472.
333 id. at 474.
134 Id. at 474-75.
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as the implementation of Internet filtering software was narrowly
tailored and employed the least restrictive means, CIPA's First
Amendment concerns would vanish.
2. Narrow Tailoring
In his narrow tailoring analysis, Judge Becker's obsession
with the small, and often harmless, inadequacies of current filter-
ing software products reared its ugly head. The judge reiterated
his concerns of excessive underblocking and overblocking and the
flawed research study conducted by the government's expert wit-
ness, and quickly concluded that the use of filtering software is not
narrowly tailored to further any compelling interest due to the
amount of constitutionally protected speech 'it erroneously
blocks. 335 The inherent "tradeoff between overblocking and un-
derblocking" in current filtering software products, and the gov-
ernment's failure to produce a product not susceptible to over-
blocking, were the overriding factors in Judge Becker's deci-
sion: 336 "[A]ny filter that blocks enough speech to protect against
access to visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography,
and harmful to minors, will necessarily overblock substantial
amounts of speech that does not fall within these categories. 337
The court soundly rejected the government's argument that it
is necessary to restrict constitutionally protected speech in a public
library in order to "suppress the dissemination of constitutionally
unprotected speech.",33' Although it is clear to this observer that
Judge Becker was demanding perfection, the judge actually stated
that the "First Amendment does not demand perfection. 339  In-
stead, he supported his ruling by referring to filtering software
products' "substantial amounts of erroneous blocking" being more
than "de minimis instances of human error." Therefore, the court
held CIPA to be facially invalid.34 °
The court then dashed the government's last hope for consti-
tutionality when it ruled that CIPA's disabling provisions, 34'
whether interpreted broadly or narrowly, failed to cure the statute's
lack of narrow tailoring. 342 Judge Becker added that even if Con-
335 Id. at 475-76.
336 Id. at 477.
317 Id. at 476-77.
338 Id. at 477. The court relied on Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002),
in which the Supreme Court rejected the same governmental argument regarding a statute
criminalizing the distribution of constitutionally protected "virtual" child pornography. Id.
339 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 479.
340 Id.
34 CIPA, supra note 17, § 1721(b) (discussing the scope of disability provisions).342 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486.
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gress meant to grant library administrators permission to unblock
all erroneously blocked constitutionally protected websites, the
disabling provisions would still fail to pass muster because the
provisions require library patrons to "ask a state actor's permission
to access disfavored content."343 Stressing the impermissible chill-
ing effect of such restrictions, the court likened CIPA's disabling
provisions to the unconstitutional speech restrictions in Lamont v.
Postmaster General,344 Denver Area Educational Telecommunica-
tions Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,3 45 and Fabulous Associates, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.34 6  The court indicated
that CIPA's disabling provisions would impermissibly chill a pa-
tron from seeking information on the Internet relating to sexual
identity, sexually transmitted diseases, and medical conditions.347
Specifically, Judge Becker relied on plaintiffs' witnesses, Emma-
lyn Rood, blocked from accessing information concerning her sex-
ual identity, and Mark Brown, blocked from researching breast
cancer, who both testified that they would have been unwilling to
approach a library administrator.348 The court also frowned on the
fact that unblocking requests generally are not immediately re-
viewed.349
3. Less Restrictive Measures
Even after invalidating CIPA on constitutional grounds, the
court found that less restrictive alternatives existed to further the
government's compelling interests.350 The court identified a num-
ber of alternatives: posting Internet use policies in prominent
places; examining Internet use logs and issuing warnings when
violations are discovered; requiring patrons to either physically or
electronically sign Internet use agreements; adopting "tap-on-the
shoulder" policies; using blocking software for minors only; giv-
ing patrons the option of using filtering software; segregating fil-
tered from unfiltered computer terminals; installing privacy
screens; and deploying recessed monitors.35' It is axiomatic that
43 Id.
-" 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (finding unconstitutional a law that required an addressee to
send a reply card before receiving his mail).
-5 518 U.S. 727, 754 (1996) (finding that a requirement that leased channel operators
segregate and block certain programming was not narrowly tailored to protect children).
- 896 F.2d 780, 785 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming decision that found that requiring users to
apply for an access code for public utility use chilled First Amendment rights).
47 Id.
348 Id. at 487.
49 Id. at 489.
350 Id. at 479-80.
351 Id. at 480-84.
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these measures fall short of perfection, but Judge Becker hid be-
hind United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. 352 and
finally revealed his true standards, stating that "unless software
filters are, themselves perfectly effective," the government may
not successfully argue that the alternatives are imperfect. 353 This
perfection requirement is the base of Judge Becker's holding as
well as his underlying reasoning, and as he said himself, does not
square with the First Amendment.
IX. A LOOK AHEAD
Judge Becker's misguided ruling served two purposes: first, it
prevented CIPA from going into effect, and second, it provided the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to instruct Congress on the
filtering software efficiency level required for legislators to regu-
late speech in public libraries. Once the Supreme Court resolves
the question of CIPA's constitutionality, the decision will affect a
substantial percentage of Americans. If CIPA stands, parents
should breathe easier, knowing that the government has reduced
the likelihood that their children will be unwillingly exposed to
pornography at the local public library. The government should
closely monitor the implementation of the filtering software and
continue to pursue more effective methods of rooting out indecent
and obscene material. The ALA and its affiliate libraries will have
a decision to make: implement the filtering software or lose vital
funding. If CIPA falls, the government must either revise the leg-
islation in its current form, or consider alternatives to filtering
software. Even today, there exist alternatives on the horizon that
may be palatable to Congress.
Daniel Orr and Josephine Ferrigno-Stack, graduate students at
the Annenberg School for Communication of the University of
Pennsylvania, present one such alternative.354 Orr and Ferrigno-
Stack conducted a study that revealed that only 2.1% of content on
the Internet is adult-oriented, and concluded that further attempts
at regulation would "likely chill more legitimate speech than it
would shield children from adult content." 355 The two graduate
students advocate a novel idea that would serve the government's
compelling interest of protecting children from exposure to harm-
ful material. Orr and Ferrigno-Stack encourage the Internet Cor-
352 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000).
353 Am. Library Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 481.
354 Daniel Orr & Josephine Ferrigno-Stack, Childproofing on the World Wide Web: A
Survey of Adult Webservers, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 465, 472 (2001).
355 Id.
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poration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)356 to adopt
an adult-oriented domain name, such as ".xxx" or ".sex."35 7 In the
authors' opinion, these new Top Level Domain names would not
violate the First Amendment. The authors also contend that it
would be easier for filtering software to recognize and filter all
websites with the same ".xxx" domain name.358 While a com-
mendable approach, Orr and Ferrigno-Stack's new domain name
would only foster an "adults only" section of the Internet. This
squares with current cable television regulation, but the question is
whether the generation that gave rise to the Internet should be the
same one that tears it down by appealing to society's lowest com-
mon denominator.
A second alternative is for children to access the Internet on
filtered computers and allow the adults the choice between filtered
and non-filtered computers. 359 In order for this proposal to suffi-
ciently meet the government's compelling interest, the computers
must be situated in different rooms, grouped together according to
their filter status.
A third alternative is to abandon attempts to shield children
from indecent material and instead, discuss their exposure to Inter-
net pornography with them.360  New York Law School Professor
Carlin Meyer proposes that Americans "ignore the growing pres-
ence of cybersmut and concentrate instead on expanding access -
especially for young people - to online sexual discussion and de-
,,36Ipiction.
These proposed alternatives are common in two distinct ways:
they likely would be free from First Amendment scrutiny, and they
would not sufficiently protect children. Instead of a specific plan,
I advocate the creation of a new Bureau within the FCC, which
would be chiefly responsible for monitoring advancements in fil-
tering software technology. The Bureau and leading filtering
software companies would work in unison, with an eye toward
creating a Universal Software Filter (USF). The USF would be
356 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, at http://www.icann.
org (last visited Mar. 25, 2003). ICANN was incorporated in 1999 to coordinate all domain
name and IP address allocation. The organization accepted proposals for new Top Level Do-
mains until late 2000, but ultimately rejected the ".xxx" domain name because of a potential
inability to shift existing adult sites to the new domain. See also Orr & Ferrigno-Stack, supra
note 355, at 473 (noting that the ".xxx" domain was proposed and rejected).
357 Orr & Ferrigno-Stack, supra note 355, at 472.
358 Id. at 473.
351 See Semitsu, supra note 16, at 542.
360 Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from the Pornographers: Cybersexual Possibilities, 83
GEO. L.J. 1969, 1974 (1995).
361 Id.
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targeted for use solely in public libraries; thus, our capitalist sys-
tem will not be threatened by any trade secrets disclosed by soft-
ware companies. Upon completion and testing of the USF, Con-
gress should pen legislation virtually identical to CIPA, and per-
suade the ALA and eventually the courts that the new filtering
product is the least restrictive means to meet the compelling gov-
ernmental interest of protecting children. At first blush, this pro-
posal appears overly simplistic. The reality, however, is that it
strikes at the heart of CIPA's one true constitutional vulnerability:
the efficiency of current filtering software. That is the precise
vulnerability that gives hope to the silver-haired grandfather view-
ing "GAY PORN PALACE," while sitting next to a 7-year-old
child at the Rocky River Public Library.
ADDENDUM
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the Children's
Internet Protection Act on March 5, 2003.362
DAVID F. NORDENt
362 A transcript is available at the United States Supreme Court Website, at http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument.transcipts/02-361.pdf (last visited Mar. 25,
2003).
t J.D. Candidate 2003, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; B.A., Indiana
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